

Support of paper ballots

- “Without paper ballots, the reconstruction of the votes cast is not possible.” (Page 16)
- “To be effective, election audits generally require a paper trail, a hard copy of voter intent that the voter has the opportunity to review for accuracy.” (Page 23)
- “the audit process is limited by the absence of a voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT).” (Page 22)
- “Current machines do not produce paper audit trails.” (Page 7)
- “There is no voter verifiable paper audit trail that allows anyone to compare the votes as recorded by the voting machine with an independent record of each vote cast using that machine. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the term “audit,” the post-election process to which our iVotronic machines are subjected does not conform to the requirements of a comprehensive, compliance, investigative, or materiality election audit.” (Page 26)

Synopsis of LAC recommendations

The General Assembly should amend S.C. Code §7-13-1620 (A) to remove the requirement that a voting system must be certified by an Election Assistance Commission accredited laboratory and add a requirement that the voting system be approved by a testing authority selected by the State Election Commission.

Track the inventory, maintenance and replacement of voting machines in the counties. Maintain a list of issues with voting machines.

Update the Election Security guide regularly. Develop policies to reduce inconsistencies of procedures, the redundancy of errors, and increase the awareness of the SEC to issues occurring throughout the state.

Establish a hotline for voters to call during elections.

Post-election tabulation audit should be required by law before election is certified. Results and analysis of post-election tabulation audit should be clearly explained and made publically available in user-friendly format. (6 recommendations)

Training and certification of election officials, directors and staff:

- Record and post audit training videos online.
- Periodically assess training needs of county election officials in order to identify weaknesses in audit training programs and adjust the schedule. Evaluate offering of training online, on weekends, and in various locations of the state.
- Test officials, directors and staff on core training. Commissioners who do not earn training certification within the established time period should be removed and replaced. (6 recommendations)

Other Recommendations

- The Real Time Audit Log (RTAL) is very expensive and has major deficiencies.
- Independence of the audit process “comes from having independent observers from the general public monitor the audit process in order to confirm its integrity.” (Page 27)
- “If the state decides to conduct another statewide procurement for voting systems, input should be sought from a wide variety of sources. For example, ... obtain input from the public, the academic community, public interest organizations, and policy makers.” (Page 45)